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SUPREME COURT EQUITY DISCRETION: THE DECREES IN
THE SEGREGATION CASES*
IN its decisions repudiating the doctrine of "separate but equal" in the field
of public education," the Supreme Court called for further argument regarding
an appropriate form of relief.2 Questions propounded by the Court center about
three interlocking problems: (1) May the Court under its equity powers for-
mulate a decree providing for gradual desegregation of the schools? (2) If so,
what factors should determine the degree of gradualness? (3) What procedures
should be followed in fixing the details of the decree ?3
*Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
The decision in Brown is a consolidated opinion incorporating four segregation cases
from school districts in Kansas, South Carolina, Delaware, and Virginia. Boiling, dealing
with segregation in the District of Columbia, was decided separately because of the different
legal questions presented. See note 1 infra. Plaintiffs are Negro children of elementary
and high school age residing in the five counties in which the suits were brought.
1. This doctrine interprets the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
as allowing states to enforce separate use of public facilities by the Negro and white Taces
so long as equal accommodations are afforded. It was adopted by the Supreme Court in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), upholding a state statute requiring segregation
in public transportation. For discussion of application of the Plessy rule to public educa-
tion, see Note, 61 YALE L.J. 730 (1952).
In Broumr, the Court held segregated educational facilities to be inherently unequal, and
hence violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, because of the
inferiority feelings they engendered in Negro pupils. Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483, 494 (1954). Since the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to action by federal
authorities, the Bolling case, concerning segregation in the District of Columbia, was decided
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court, however, found that
the concepts of equal protection and due process were "not mutually exclusive," and held
that segregation in the District of Columbia constituted an arbitrary deprivation of liberty
in violation of due process. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
For analysis of the decisions in Broun; and Bolling, see Borinski, A Legal and Sociologi-
cal Analysis of the Segregatior Decision of May 17, 1954, 15 PiTrs. L. REV. 622 (1954).
2. The original argument before the Supreme Court was held December 9-11, 1952.
Although two of the five questions proposed by the Court in June, 1953, for reargument the
following fall, related to the issue of implementing a decision abolishing educational segre-
gation, the briefs and arguments naturally focused on the other three questions dealing with
the constitutionality of segregation in public education. The Court therefore decided only
the constitutional issue, asking for further reargument on the question of relief. Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495-6 (1954). The cases are presently scheduled for
final argument on December 9, 1954. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1954, p. 1, cols. 4-5.
3. The questions read as follows:
"4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth
Amendment
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Legality of a Gradual Decree
There is little precedent to guide the Court in determining whether its equity
discretion admits of a gradual decree in these cases.4 The Court has already
decided that an equitably enforceable constitutional right exists;r the only
question is when enforcement is to come.0 Past judicial pronouncements as-
"(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by normal
geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to schools of
their choice, or
"(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit an effective gradual
adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a system not based on
color distinction?
"5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assuming
further that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4(b),
"(a) should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases;
"(b) if so, what specific issues should the decrees reach;
"(c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence with a view to recom-
mending specific terms for such decrees;
"(d) should this Court remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame
decrees in these cases, and if so what general directions should the decrees of this Court
include and what procedures should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the
specific terms of more detailed decrees?" Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483,
495-6 (1954).
4. For cases from which analogies may be drawn, see notes 15-25 infra, and accompany-
ing text.
5. Browmn and Boiling determined that plaintiffs have a constitutional right to non-
segregated education. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495-6 (1954); Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). Only equitable relief has been asked, and the
Court is concerned only with the question of when an injunction is to issue. See tote 3
suipra.
6. See note 3 supra. "Gradual" desegregation generally implies one of three methods:
1) A future date is established by which time desegregation must be accomplished. 2) A
period of time is -permitted before desegregation is to begin. 3) Various forms of piece-meal
desegregation, including: desegregation of different geographical areas at different dates;
desegregation of different institutional units at different dates, e.g., one school at a time;
desegregation of different grades at different dates; progressively increasing quotas of the
number of Negroes to be admitted to a given unit. The proponents of these types of gradual
decrees envision a relatively long grace period, because they conceive of these decrees as
means for permitting adjustment on the part of the general public. See Clark, Desegrega-
tion: An, Appraisal of the Evidence, 9 J. SociAL IssuEs 34-6 (1953) ; Note, 61 YAm LJ.
730.
"Forthwith" desegregation, while implying immediacy, has not been so used by the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People, representing plaintiffs in four
of the present cases. The N.A.A.C.P. has equated "forthwith" with "as of the beginning
of the next school term." See note 27 infra.
There is another form of desegregation which may be considered "gradual" because its
implementation would require a decree permitting delay in certain cases. This type would
limit delay to the time required to effect the administrative changes necessary to bring about
desegregation without a "decrease in the general efficiency of functioning of the institution
involved." See Clark, supra at 12. Where there are no administrative barriers, this ap-
proach to desegregation would amount to immediate or forthwith desegregation.
This first section deals only with the legality or propriety of a decree recognizing delay
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cribing wide powers to equity courts have not pertained to this narrow area
of equitable discretion.7 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has never yet de-
of any sort. For consideration of the type of factors which should determine the degree of
gradualness, if a gradual decree is rendered, see below under heading: Factors Determining
Gradualness.
7. The Supreme Court has often used sweeping language to describe the range of its
discretionary powers in equity cases. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
500 (1941) ; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) ; Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333
U.S. 426, 431 (1948) ; Alabama Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341. U.S. 341, 361 (1951) (con-
curring opinion of Frankfurter, J.). It has long been recognized that equity courts can
adapt their decrees to unusual circumstances. 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 28 (14th
ed. 1918) ; 1 PoMExoY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 111, 170, 175a (5th ed. 1881.). Where
the public interest is involved, equity discretion is considered to be particularly broad and
flexible; the Court has spoken of its power to "balance the interests" and consider the claims
of the community in such equity cases. See Porter v. Warner Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946) ;
Virginian Ry. v. Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) ; Hecht Co. v. Bowles, supra at 329.
From some of these judicial statements it might seem that the Court in the instant cases has
broad discretion to balance public convenience against plaintiffs' claims. However, gen-
eralized statements about equity discretion are ambiguous, for they do not specify to which
stage of the judicial process they refer. "Balancing of interests" may occur in at least five
stages in the decision of a case; and most of the broad statements of equity discretion are
found in cases relating to one of the first four of these stages, all of which have been passed
in the present cases.
In the first place, the Court may balance conflicting interests in determining whether
to decide the questions presented by a case. Where important questions of state policy are
involved, the Court may remand to a lower federal court with directions to retain juris-
diction pending construction of a statute in a state court. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co.,
supra; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168 (1942) ; AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582
(1946). Or, where thorny issues of local law are intertwined with constitutional issues, and
plaintiff has an adequate remedy in the state courts, the Court may refuse to adjudicate the
case. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) ; Alabama Comm'n v. Southern Ry.,
supra. Similarly, the Court has declined to enjoin prosecution of criminal cases on the
ground that a court of equity will not ordinarily enjoin criminal prosecution. Douglas v.
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) ; Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941). Finally, there are
cases which the Court has refused to adjudicate because plaintiff has not exhausted his
administrative remedies. Petroleum Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 304 U.S. 209 (1938).
All the cases in this first category are essentially forumn iwn convenicns cases and do not
become res judicata on the question of relief.
A second area of equitable discretion presents itself when a court determines whether
to issue an interim injunction pending adjudication of plaintiff's rights. See Rice Adams Co.
v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509 (1929).
Thirdly, the Court may balance community interests against those of plaintiff to deter-
mine whether he has a right, i.e., whether he is entitled to any relief at all. And the Supreme
Court has done this even in the case of such intangible constitutional rights as freedom of
speech and the right to due process. See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) ; Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). The Court balances
conflicting interests of this nature in the same manner when the question arises in cases
where there is no question of equitable relief involved. Compare Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948), with Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
A fourth stage of equity discretion arises where a right has been found to exist and the
Court balances conflicting interests to determine whether to grant legal or equitable relief.
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cided whether it may delay vindication of already adjudicated constitutional
rights.8
Past Supreme Court interpretations of the nature of the rights involved
in segregation cases appear to militate against a gradual decree. The Court
has frequently emphasized that these rights are inseparable from the in-
dividual claimant by terming them "personal and present." In the instant
cases, plaintiffs have only a limited number of years of public education remain-
ing. Therefore it can be forcefully argued that postponement of relief would
result in partially or totally destroying the very rights the decree is intended
to enforce.' 0
See Harrisonville v. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933) ; Beasley v. Texas & Pacific
Ry., 191 U.S. 492 (1903).
In Browt. and Boiling, these four stages have already passed, since a right enforceable
only in equity has been found to exist. See note 5 supra. The fifth area of equity discretion,
where the only question is when to grant equitable relief, presents considerations quite dis-
tinct from those involved in other stages. See notes 15-25 infra and accompanying text.
8. The closest the Court has come to deciding this question wvas in Youngstown Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). To avert a steel strike which threatened to paralyze the
Korean War effort, the President ordered seizure of the steel industry. The government
contended that, even assuming the seizure's unconstitutionality, an overriding public interest
prevented the issuance of an injunction against the seizure. The Court might have ordered
that an injunction issue after the government had had time to avert the emergency. Im-
mediate relief was granted, however, and only Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion
answered the government's argument: "'Balancing the equities' is lawyers' jargon for choos-
ing between conflicting public interests. When Congress itself has struck the balance,...
a court of equity is not justified in ignoring that pronouncement under the guise of exercis-
ing equitable discretion." Id. at 609-10.
9. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635 (1950) ; McLaurin -. Oklahoma State Regents,
339 U.S. 637, 642 (1950) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948) ; Sipuel Y. Board of
Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948) ; Missouri ex reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351
(1938) ; McCabe v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 162 (1914).
What the Court considers the significance of "personal and present" rights is indicated
by what it said of the Negro plaintiff in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, stpra at 633: "The state
must provide [a legal education] for her ... and provide it as soon as it does for applicants
of any other group." In Missouri ex reL. Gaines v. Canada, supra, defendants pointed out that
the state was providing out-of-state scholarships to Negro law students only until such time
as it was feasible to establish in Missouri an entire separate school for Negroes. In ordering
the plaintiff admitted to the law school for white students the Court stated: "We cannot
regard the discrimination as excused by what is called its temporary character." Id. at 352.
The Court emphasized that "petitioner's right was a personal one. It was as an individual
that he was entitled to the equal protection of the laws ... ." Id. at 351.
10. In its role of amnicus curiae in the instant cases, the government has contended that
it is no answer to the claim of a particular plaintiff to say that, at some time in the future,
others will receive the equality of treatment which is his, plaintiff's, constitutional right.
Supplemental Brief for United States on Reargument, Oct. Term 1953, p. 165, Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Some legal scholars assert that an individual has a right only to the e.'tent that the right
is enforced by the courts. See FRAux, Conars oN TRL%. 9-12, 24-7 (1950) ; Lumvm az,
THE BRAmBLE Busn 84 (1951) ; Holmes, The Path of the Law in CoLLEcrED LEAL PRwAns
168-73 (1952). The Supreme Court has held that plaintiffs in the instant cases have rights
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But neither lack of precedent nor the doctrine of "personal and present rights"
necessarily precludes the issuance of gradual decrees in the present cases. Brown
v. Board of Education and Boiling v. Sharpe are unique in their applicability
to future litigation challenging segregation in public education, 1 ' and in the
variety of problems which may exist in the different localities thereby affected.'
"
Whereas implementation of previous decisions enunciating the "personal and
present" doctrine was relatively simple,' 3 the magnitude of the barriers to im-
mediate enforcement of Brown and Bolling may make a gradual decree inevi-
table.' 4 If the Court so concludes, it may find some support in past issuance of
gradual decrees in actions to enjoin the commission of a tort, in government
antitrust suits, and in prior educational segregation cases decided by other state
and federal tribunals under the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson.
Tort cases in which gradual decrees have been entered have typically been
actions to enjoin the continuance of a nuisance or the infringement of a patent.,
In water rights cases involving pollution or diversion, for example, the Supreme
to non-segregated education. See note 5 supra. If the Court postpones vindication of these
rights for a year, it will in fact be denying the rights of those plaintiffs who are completing
their last year of public education; further postponement will result in denial to an ever in-
creasing number of plaintiffs. The absurdity of a decision holding that plaintiffs have rights,
followed by a decree which in effect denies those rights, is apparent.
1k The decrees in Brown and Bolling will, of course, directly affect only the five coun-
ties against whose school boards suit has been brought. And of these, three counties (Wiln-
ington, Delaware, The District of Columbia, and Topeka, Kansas) have already desegre-
gated. New York Times, Oct. 3, 1954, p. 74, cols. 3-8. However, there are over 2,500,000
Negro students in 15,000 segregated schools in the 17 states which maintained segregation
prior to the decision. See FEDERAL SEcURITY AGonC,, STATIsTIcs OF STATn SenooL SYs-
rEms 1949-50, p. 98, table 36. It is already apparent that desegregation will be accomplished
in a number of states only after each school board has been sued. See note 38 infra. The
decrees in the present cases will inevitably determine the type of relief which will be given
in these future suits.
12. See notes 28 and 29 injra, and accompanying text.
13. In public education cases, the "personal and present" rights doctrine has been
applied only to education on the professional and graduate school levels. Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) ; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sipuel
v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) ; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337
(1938). Each case concerned only a single plaintiff. In none were there any problems such
as transferring students or changing curriculum, nor did the decisions affect any large num-
ber of students or institutions. See Clark, Desegregation: An Appraisal of the Evtden ce,
9 J. SOCIAL IssuEs 32 (1953). In McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914),
which involved personal rights to equality of treatment in public transportation, relief was
denied. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) prohibited judicial enforcement of restrictive
covenants based on race. Therefore no problems of implementation were involved.
14. See notes 28 and 29 infra.
15. E.g., Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929), modified, 281 U.S. 179 (1930),
289 U.S. 395 (1933), 309 U.S. 569, 311 U.S. 107 (1940) (diversion of lake water) ; Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), modified, 237 U.S. 474 (1915), 240 U.S. 650
(1916) (smoke nuisance) ; Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46 (1913) (pollution
of stream) ; Westinghouse Air-Brake Co. v. Great Northern Ry., 86 Fed. 132 (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1898) (patent infringement).
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Court has granted gradual decrees where it appeared that immediate enforce-
ment of claimant's right might bring great injury to the public or inordinate
loss to the defendant without bringing proportional benefit to the plaintiff.1 6
To the extent that immediate desegregation in some areas would result in a
significant lowering of the quality of education afforded students of all races,
these cases may afford a useful analogy. However, since they have involved
property rather than personal rights, the analogy is limited. Postponement of
equitable relief need not represent delayed vindication of a property right, since
monetary damages generally will compensate for any loss thereby sustained.,
But no money value can be assigned to the intangible right to enjoy equal edu-
cational facilities. Moreover, whereas plaintiff in the typical nuisance case has
the right to enjoy his land "forever,"'-8 there can be only a limited period of
enjoyment of the rights involved in the instant cases.
Gradual decrees have frequently been a matter of necessity in government
antitrust suits because of the magnitude of interests involved."0 Decrees order-
ing divestiture of large holdings or reorganization of vast and complex corpora-
tions cannot be effected overnight.2 0 Similarly, the administrative difficulties in
16. In Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929), gradual relief was granted to several
states suing to enjoin withdrawal of water from Lake Michigan by the Sanitary District of
Chicago. As the entire sewage system of Chicago was dependent on the withdrawal, grant-
ing immediate relief would have involved the risk of a grave health hazard to several
millions of people. See also Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46 (1913). There
defendants were given time to alleviate water pollution caused by their mining, since order-
ing immediate relief would have destroyed their industry.
17. In some cases where the courts have postponed the issuance of an injunction on a
balancing of the equities, the right has nevertheless been vindicated immediately by grant-
ing money damages. See, e.g., Home v. Mit. Vernon Die Casting Corp., 181 Misc. 758, 44
N.Y.S.2d 520 (Sup. Ct 1943), modified, 278 App. Div. 671, 48 N.Y.S2d 37 (1st Dep't 1944).
There the court granted plaintiff monthly payments equivalent to the depreciation in rental
value of his property due to disturbances caused by defendant's munition factory. These
payments were to continue until the court found that the enterprise could be enjoined. See
also Bailey v. City of New York, 38 Misc. 641, 78 N.Y. Supp. 210 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
18. Because of the potentially infinite duration of the ownership of tangible property,
a fee simple estate is defined today in the same manner as it was described by Littleton in
the 15th century: "lands or tenements to hold to [the owner] and his heirs forever." fov-
-IHA', LAW OF REAL PROPERIY 17 (1940).
19. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the district court had
allowed thirty days for compliance with a decree ordering partial dissolution of defendant's
business organization. The Supreme Court held that this period was too short "in view of
the magnitude of the interests involved and their complexity." Id. at 81. Gradual decrees
were also involved in Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (194) ; United
States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
20. See note 19 supra. The decree in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911), entailed the dissolution of a combination of more than forty corporations and the
transfer of stock in the amount of $90,000,000. The transactions involved had taken place
over a 40-year period. The decree in United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
(1911), required transfer of stock and dissolution of a combination involving sixty-five
American and two English corporations.
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revamping an entire school system may be so great as to prevent its immediate
accomplishment. 2' However, any analogy here is severely limited, for govern-
ment antitrust cases are not concerned with vindicating individual rights.-"
In the cases most similar to those now before the Court-state and lower
federal court decisions concerning equality of education under Plessy v. For-
gutson-gradual decrees were sometimes rendered to allow time for accom-
plishing administrative tasks.23 Where Negro school facilities could not be made
equal or were non-existent, immediate relief was afforded by ordering plaintiff
admitted to the local school for white students.24 In other cases, however, de-
crees were issued allowing defendants a reasonable time to equalize facilities.
Plaintiffs meanwhile continued to attend the inferior school. 25 Although the
issue of gradualness was never raised in these cases, 20 they afford examples of
decrees in personal rights cases which take into account the time necessary for
solving administrative problems.
21. See notes 28 and 29 ifra, and accompanying text.
22. In antitrust suits prosecuted by the government, no individual rights are asserted.
The government is concerned primarily with securing the public interest, although individ-
ual interests are naturally affected by the disposition of the case. The subsidiary position of
private rights in government antitrust suits is emphasized by the fact that, if the court issues
a gradual decree, no individuals are awarded damages for any injury they sustain because
relief was not immediate. On the other hand, private individuals who bring antitrust actions
are entitled to damages up to the time when the illegal activities are permanently enjoined.
23. See, e.g., Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, modified and aff'd, 103 F. Supp. 920
(E.D.S.C. 1952). There, the district court ordered defendants to remedy inequalities within
six months. 98 F. Supp. at 537-8. This entailed revision of curriculum, consolidation of school
districts, new transportation facilities, installation of new equipment, and school house con-
struction. 103 F. Supp. at 921-2. For instances of similar decrees, see note 25 infra.
24. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (could not equalize) ; Sipuel v.
Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1.948) (no facilities for Negroes) ; Missouri cX rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (same) ; University of Maryland v. Murray, 169 Md. 478,
182 Atl. 590 (1936) (same).
In two instances, state courts ordered plaintiff admitted immediately to the local white
school even though, theoretically, the facilities could have been equalized. Graham v. Board
of Education, 153 Kan. 840, 114 P.2d 313 (1941) ; Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 343, 87
A.2d 862 (Ch. 1952), aff'd, Gebhart v. Belton, - Del. -, 91 A.2d 137 (1952).
25. See, e.g., Wrighten v. Board of Trustees, 72 F. Supp. 948 (E.D.S.C. 1947) ; and two
unreported cases decided in the federal district court in Virginia on April 7, 1948, Smith
v. School Board of King George County, and Ashley v. School Board of Gloucester County,
Va. For description of these two cases see FRANK, CASES ON CoNsrrrTONAL LAW, 1040-3
(1952).
In two of the cases now before the Supreme Court, the district courts entered gradual
decrees allowing time for equalization. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, modified and aft'd,
103 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.S.C. 1952); Davis v. County School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D.
Va. 1952).
26. In several instances, plaintiffs initially claimed the right of immediate relief by ad-
mission to the existing schools for whites. See, e.g., Wrighten v. Board of Trustees, 72 F.
Supp. 948 (E.D.S.C. 1947) ; Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1952). However,
once the lower court upheld the validity of the segregation laws and ruled against admittance
to the schools for whites, plaintiffs did not contest the gradual decree which allowed time for




Plaintiffs in the instant cases concede that conditions in certain areas may
make immediate desegregation impossible.27 Problems of curriculum, trans-
portation, and reallocation of students and teachers must be solved merely to
get the two racial groups into the same schools.2 Another serious consideration
is that, despite the requirements of Plessy, Negro children in many communities
have been provided with an education significantly inferior to that afforded
27. Brief for Appellants on Reargument, Oct. Term, 1953, p. 193, Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, representing plain-
tiffs in all but the District of Columbia case, contended that the Court had no equitable dis-
cretion to render a gradual decree, but did not insist that desegregation take place in the
middle of a school term. Id. at 190-3. Alternatively, the N.A.A.C.P. maintained that, even
if the Court should decide that equity discretion might permit gradual enforcement of per-
sonal, constitutional Tights, there were no relevant factors that could justify postponing
relief beyond the beginning of the next school term. Ibid.
The 1952 brief for the United States as amicus curiae had contained the first proposals
for gradual relief. While expressing the belief that a program for orderly transition would
lessen popular antagonisms, the factors which the government indicated should be considered
as grounds for postponing relief were essentially administrative. The government brief filed
in answer to the question put forward by the Court in its order of June 8th, 1953, generally
followed the proposals of the 1952 brief. However, it suggested a time limit of one year for
accomplishing desegregation. Supplemental Brief for the United States on Reargument,
Oct. Term, 1953, pp. 186-7, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 4 83 (1954).
The defendants' position was somewhat unclear. On oral argument Justin Moore, ap-
pearing in behalf of the Virginia school authorities, stated: . . . If there should be this un-
happy, unfortunate decree ... the case should be remanded ... about all we can say is we
feel the courts should be given the broadest discretion to act along reasonable lines. ' Trans-
cript of Argument, Davis v. County School Board, December 14, 1953, p. 52, decided sub
nor. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The brief of Appellees in Briggs
v. Elliott, indicated a belief that antitrust cases constituted sufficient authority for gradual
decrees in these cases. Brief for Appellees, Briggs v. Elliott, Oct. Term, 1953, pp. 81-2,
decided sub nor. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
None of the parties indicated which factors, in its opinion, might be considered in deter-
mining the degree of gradualness, and which should be disregarded.
28. See Supplemental Brief for the United States on Reargument, Oct. Term, 1953,
pp. 170-2, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The government also there
points out that tax laws will have to be changed in some states, administrative duplications
eliminated, and school districts consolidated and rezoned.
Extensive changes in curriculum may be required because some communities have made
different courses available to the two races. A common method of proving inequality has
been to show differences in curriculum. See Graham v. Board of Education, 153 Kan. 840,
845, 114 P.2d 313, 317 (1941) ; Briggs v. Elliott, 103 F. Supp. 920, 922 (E-.D.S.C. 1952). In
the unreported case of Smith v. School Board of King George County (D. Va., April 7,
1948), the superintendent of schools stated that the two types of instruction were offered
with a view to equipping the children for different positions in life. FRAim, CASES ON CoN-
sTTruTioNAL LAw 1042 (1952).
Where school districts are consolidated and children from a wider area attend the same
school, transportation may have to be provided although it was previously unnecessary. In
other instances, transportation has been available only to one race. See Belton v. Gebhart,
32 Del. Ch. 343, 361) 87 A.2d 862, 871 (Ch. 1952).
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whites.29 Putting Negro and white children of the same grade but different
levels of preparation into one classroom could prove detrimental to the educa-
tion of both.30 The Court's decision appears to be predicated on the assumption
that desegregation will provide the plaintiffs with an education superior to that
previously afforded.3' If this be so, the Court's aim in formulating the decrees
should be to improve the quality of education available to plaintiffs. The decrees
in these cases should therefore be sufficiently flexible to resolve administrative
problems where these are such that immediate desegregation would temporarily
reduce the quality of Negro education even below its previous level.
Economic factors present no obstacle to immediate desegregation. Not only
is amalgamation less expensive than maintaining the present segregated school
system,32 but two billion dollars would be required for equalization of all Negro
schools on a "separate but equal" basis.
33
29. See Carter, The Court's Decision and the South, Reader's Digest, Sept. 1954, pp.
51-6. Where the Negro schools are inferior the disparity in academic achievement of white
and Negro students increases with each grade. Ibid. Inferior achievements of Negro stu-
dents in certain areas of the South are due to a number of factors but can be traced primarily
to economic discrimination in allocating school funds. Average per capita expenditures
throughout the South for public education in 1951-52 were $116 per Negro student as com-
pared with $180 per white student. PuBLic AFFAIRS PAMPHLET 209, SEGREGATION AND TIIu
ScHooLs 17 (issued in collaboration with the N.A.A.C.P.). In certain states the disparity
is considerably greater. Mississippi's annual expenditures in public education in 1951-52
averaged $32.55 per Negro student as compared with $122.93 per white student. FEDERAL
SECURITY AGENCY STATISTCS OF STATE SCHOOL SYSTzMS 105 (1950). Also contributing
to the poorer education of Negro pupils is the fact that many of their teachers have not had
the educational advantages of their white colleagues. Carter, supra. Negro university stu-
dents are reported to have had difficulty competing with white students because of these
handicaps. PUBLIC AFFAIRS PAMPHLET 209, supra at 12. See also ASHMORm, THE NEGIRO
AND THE ScHooLs 43 (1954). See also note 28 supra.
30. See note 29 supra. Lowering of standards in mixed schoolrooms is feared by sonic
southerners who otherwise approve the Court's decision. See Carter, The Court's Decision
and the South, Reader's Digest, Sept. 1954, pp. 51-6. The prior educational advantages of
the white students would be wasted and Negro inferiority feelings might be enhanced if
the two groups were thrown indiscriminately together and the instructor forced to find a
common denominator for students widely separated in academic achievement. It may be
necessary to devise aptitude tests for all students in such cases, placing those who would be
unable to keep up with the desired standards for a given grade into special classes, but with-
out regard to race.
31. The Court quoted and adopted as the basis for its holding the findings of the district
court in the Kansas case: "a sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn.
Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational
and mental development of Negro children ... ." Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
481,494 (1954).
32. The Attorney General of Virginia conceded this in his brief. See Brief for Appellees,
Davis v. County School Board, Oct. Term, 1952, p. 21, decided sub norn. Brown v. Board of
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. See estimates made by the United States Office of Education as reported in Supple-
mental Brief for United States on Reargument, Oct. Term, 1953, p. 172, Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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NOTES
Psychological arguments advanced as to the need for indulging deep-rooted
racial feelings should be given no weight in formulating the decrees.A3 No
analogy can be derived from past equity cases to support a decree allowing such
considerations to delay vindication of a constitutional right. Furthermore, sound
policy precludes such a decree. Certainly the irrational opposition of a segment
of society cannot be allowed to hamper enforcement of constitutional rights.
One purpose of the Constitution is to protect the interests of often unpopular
minorities. 35 Moreover, experiences in both voluntary and compulsory desegre-
gation have clearly demonstrated that the removal of artificial barriers is a most
effective way of combating such prejudices.A6
34. For such arguments, see Brief for Appellees on Reargument, Briggs Y. Elliott,
Oct. Term, 1953, pp. 77-9, decidcd sub im. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
The contention that gradualness is necessary to prevent a "violent emotional reaction"
seems to be based on the fact that segregation is deeply ingrained in the "habits, customs
and usages of the people over a long period of time." Id. at 76-7. To break suddenly with
this tradition, the argument runs, would exacerbate racial antagonisms; not only would race
prejudice be increased but the entire school system might break down. Id. at 76-9, 84-6.
But the fact is that integration generally decreases racial feelings. See note 36 infra. And
it is doubtful that any school system will break down because of emotional reactions unless
they take the form of overt opposition to enforcement of the Supreme Court's decision. As
to such opposition, see text at notes 37-9 infra.
35. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (municipal zoning on basis of
race invalid); Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946) (ordinance prohibiting literature dis-
tribution by Jehovah's Witnesses invalid) ; De Jonge v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 352 (1937) (Com-
munits' right of assembly upheld).
36. Racial integration in all aspects of daily living has been successfully achieved on a
large scale in the armed forces. While this desegregation wvas gradual as to each service as
a whole, it was immediate as to the individual units involved. The experiences are therefore
the same as would be encountered in cases of instantaneous desegregation. No incidents of
friction have been reported. REPORT By THE PnESIDENT'S CoMx'rm ON EQUAU"TY OF
OPpoRTuNrry IN THE A-mim SERvicES 44 (1950). During the last war a survey was made
of the attitudes of white soldiers who served with Negroes in combat units. Three out of
four stated that their attitudes toward Negroes had improved as a result. Id. at 53. Similar
findings have been made in studies of desegregation in religious groups, hospitals, health
services, public accommodations, recreational facilities, organized sports, employment, and
educational institutions. These findings were made in areas throughout the country. Methods
of desegregation included desegregation compelled by community officials, the legislature or
judiciary, as well as voluntary desegregation. See Clark, Desegregation: An Appraisal of
the Evidence, 9 J. SocaL. IssuEs (1953) ; Appendix to Appellants' Briefs: A Social Science
Statement, Oct. Term, 1952, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Note, 61
YALE LJ. 730 (1952).
A group of social scientists which studied past instances of desegregation in connection
with the cases now before the Court, concluded that gradual, "segmentalized" desegregation
is less effective than immediate desegregation, and increases the chances of resistance and
resentment. Clark, supra at 42-8. Gradual desegregation may be interpreted by both white
and Negro as evidence of vacillation and indecision on the part of authorities, and a reflec-
tion of their own belief that there is something inherently dangerous in the desegregation
process. AnoRNo, et aL., THE AUTH0RITAmIAN Pznso rAa. (1951). And whites involved
in the first stages of desegregation tend to resent being "guinea pigs." TWroN, Co t usmr
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The Court's equity discretion does not extend to permitting delay based on
the possibility that social or political upheavals may result from enforcing the
decisions.3 7 Any indication that the courts will stay their hands to avoid the
consequences of opposition to their decrees would be an open invitation to coer-
cion of the judiciary.38 The principle that illegal acts should not be allowed to
deprive a person of his constitutional rights should certainly apply to threatened
action in defiance of the Court's authority.
30
ix Cisis 71 (1953); Culver, Racial Desegregation in Education in Indiana, 23 J. N iato
EDUC. 296-302 (1954); Clark, supra at 46.
Professor Clark contends that it is erroneous to believe that education, propaganda, and
non-authoritarian approaches are necessary before social changes such as desegregation
can be effected. When concrete, external pressures conflict with subjective, irrational moti-
vations, the individual tends to modify his attitude to conform with the authoritatively estab-
lished pattern of behavior. This is particularly true in the case of segregation, where in-
dividual racial attitudes are supported by observing the practice of segregation. When this
support is removed and the opposite attitude is supported by law, prejudices will tend to be
changed. Id. at 42-8.
37. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917), where, in holding discriminatory
municipal zoning invalid, the Supreme Court stated: "It is urged that this proposed segre-
gation will promote public peace by preventing race conflict. Desirable as this is, and im-
portant as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim cannot be accomplished by laws
or ordinances which deny rights created or protected by the Federal Constitution."
38. In its amicus curiae brief filed in the forthcoming arguments, Florida warns that
violence will result from immediate enforcement. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1954, p. 1, col. 1.
Other forms of opposition include threats of legislative action to abolish the public schools
should no other means of maintaining segregation be found. Mississippi has already passed
a constitutional amendment authorizing the school boards to take such action if necessary,
and the Alabama legislature has recommended a similar amendment. Time, Sept. 27, 1954,
p. 60.
In two instances where school boards have desegregated in advance of the Court's
decree, protest meetings accompanied by threats of violence have caused a return to segre-
gation. Time, Sept. 27, 1954, p. 60; N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1954, p. 18, col. 1. However, when
the school board of Fairmont, West Virginia, obtained an injunction prohibiting demon-
strations and threats against its integration policy, and the county judge (Meridith)
promised to enforce the injunction if he had to "fill the jail until their feet are sticking out
the windows," opposition ceased immediately. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1954, p. 32, col. 2. Due
to the firm action of local officials, demonstrations in Baltimore and Washington, D.C.,
waned after a week. N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1954, p. 25, col. 8. Past experiences with racial
conflicts demonstrate that the prospect of firm and unwavering enforcement can prevent
incidents. See Note, 61 YALE L.J. 730, 743 (1952). See also letter from Dr. Kenneth Clark
to N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1954, p. 22, col. 7, concerning Gov. Boggs' responsibility for dis-
turbances in southern Delaware.
Subsequent to publication of Dr. Clark's letter, the Attorney General of Delaware ap-
peared as amicus curiae in the Chancery Court requesting an injunction ordering reinstate-
ment in the Milford High School of ten Negro students. They had been expelled because
of public opposition to integration. The injunction was granted. N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1954,
p. 1, cols. 6, 7.
39. When people are led to act illegally because an individual exercises his legal right,
the proper procedure is to protect the legal right, if necessary by punishing those who use
illegal means to oppose it. See Sellers v. Johnson, 163 F.2d 877, 883 (8th Cir. 1947), where
the court held that the police were not entitled to prevent the Jehovah's Witnesses from
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Procedures for Formulating the Decrees
The Supreme Court's questions regarding the procedure to be followed in
fixing the details of the decrees concern mainly issues of policy, not of law. The
Court's dispositive powers are broad enough to provide for a decree of any
specificity.40 The long standing practice of the Supreme Court has been to
remand the case rather than to enter a decree itself.4' It has, however, frequent-
ly formulated decrees in considerable detail, and designated procedures to be
followed by the lower courts on remand.42 The Court's decree should be specific
enough to insure uniform and effective implementation of the present decisions
and to guide future litigants. On the other hand, the Court's often expressed
sentiment that details of decrees are best left in the hands of lower court judges
is particularly applicable here because of the varied conditions in the different
localities affected by the segregation decisions. 43 The decrees in these cases
holding their meeting in order to avoid public conflict. Rather, the police should have acted
against the mob which threatened violence.
See also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1
(1949) Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) ; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). But cf. Feiner v. New, York, 340
U.S. 315 (1951).
40. The dispositive powers of the Court are set out in 62 STAT. 922 (1948), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2106 (1952). The only limitation placed on the Court is that its judgments should be
"just under the circumstances."
41. There are instances in its history when the Supreme Court, functioning under older
statutes, both formulated and entered decrees in cases arising from state or federal courts.
See, e.g., The London Packet, 5 Wheat. 132 (U.S. 182-0); Tyler v. Magwire, 17 Wall. 253
(U.S. 1872) ; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U.S. 1824).
42. See, e.g., decrees in United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948);
Schine Chain Theaters v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
43. Much discretion is vested in federal district courts to mold their decrees to the
exigencies of the individual case. The Supreme Court has frequently stated that details of
decrees are best left to district court judges who are closer to the facts of the case and who
may spend considerable time hearing evidence on the decree alone. See International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 400-01. (1947) ; United States v. National Lead Co., 332
U.S. 319, 329-36 (1947) ; United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 185
(1944).
The government suggested remand to the district courts in the present cases, with in-
structions to enjoin the defendants forthwith from using race or color as a basis of admis-
sion to their public schools "provided, however, that if the defendants show that it is im-
practicable or inequitable to grant the plaintiffs the remedy of immediate (i.e., at the
beginning of the next school term) admission to nonsegregated schools, the court shall
order the defendants to propose and, on approval by the court after a public hearing, to put
into effective operation a program for transition to a nonsegregated school system as ex-
peditiously as circumstances permit." Supplemental Brief for the United States on Re-
argument, Oct. Term, 1953, p. 186, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The
defendants also recommended remand to the district courts which, however, in their view
could not impose a particular plan of desegregation upon the local school boards, as this
would impinge on the prerogatives of a sovereign state. Brief for Appellees on Reargument,
Briggs v. Elliott, Oct. Term, 1953, pp. 84-5, decided sub non. Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Defendants' position apparently was that the lower courts could fix
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should clearly indicate the types of administrative factors which may justify
delay. 44 Each district court, on remand, may then hold hearings as in the anti-
trust cases to determine to what extent, if any, such factors exist, and the time
required to overcome them.
4 5
The Court's question 5 (c) concerns the appointment of a special master to
hear new evidence to assist it in formulating a decree.40 Appointment of a mas-
ter in a case where the Court functions as an appellate tribunal would be un-
precedented. 47 And it is dubious whether a special master acting for an appellate
tribunal could hear new evidence, since there is question as to such a court's
own power to do so. 48 Furthermore, if it is decided that the lower courts shall
hold hearings to adapt the rate of desegregation to the requirements of each
situation, a master would be of little value.
Since, by their nature, the rights involved in these cases require prompt vin-
dication, no considerations of mere convenience should delay implementation
of the Court's decision. A decree directing the lower court to determine the
minimum time required for solving unavoidable administrative impediments to
immediate desegregation would enforce plaintiff's rights as effectively and real-
istically as possible.
a time limit in each case but that it would be for the local school authorities to determine
the manner of desegregation.
The N.A.A.C.P., because of its view that a gradual decree would not properly protect
plaintiffs' rights, did not suggest terms for such a decree. Brief for Appellants on Re-
argument, Oct. Term, 1953, p. 195, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
44. The Court's oft-expressed reluctance to involve the judiciary in administration of
complex and detailed matters, or in interference with the internal affairs of the states, goes
only to the Court's discretion and not to its power to act. See United States v. Paramount
Pictures, 344 U.S. 131, 165 (1948). And see Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 616
(1945), where the Court stated: "The difficulties of drafting and enforcing a decree are
no justification for us to refuse to perform the important function entrusted to us by the
Constitution."
45. Since large cities such as Washington, D.C., Wilmington, Delaware, and Baltimore,
Md., have successfully desegregated in the course of a summer, it is improbable that ad-
ministrative considerations would justify delay beyond the "next school term" in most
cases. Communities in Missouri and Arkansas have also desegregated without difficulty.
See Time, Sept. 27, 1954, p. 60.
46. See note 3 supra.
47. In cases where the Supreme Court functions as a court of original jurisdiction,
appointment of a master to find the facts has been common. See, e.g., Illinois v. Indiana,
321 U.S. 752 (1944); Vermont v. New Hampshire, 282 U.S. 796 (1930); Wisconsin v.
Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
48. The Supreme Court has held several times that an equity court cannot hear new
evidence in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. See, e.g., Blease v. Garlington, 92 U.S.
1 (1875). In so far as these cases rested on the statutory prohibition of 1803 (2 STAT. 244)
they are not controlling since that provision was repealed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, 62
STAT. 923 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1952). However, the Court has stated that, apart
from statute, the established chancery practice precludes hearing of new evidence on appeal.
Russell v. Southherd, 12 How. 139, 159 (U.S. 1851). Established practice may remain al-
though the statute has been repealed.
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